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Abstract
Forest ecosystems, including plantation forests, provide goods and services that are marketable and non-
marketable. Positive externalities produced by forest ecosystems are rarely considered in pricing of marketable 
products that result in economic inefficiencies. Internalizing externalities is required to improve the economic 
efficiency. The traditional way to internalize an externality is by providing subsidies or imposing taxes. Recently, 
payments for environmental services  are receiving more attention as an instrument for internalizing externalities 
provided by forest ecosystems. This promising alternative to improve our environment needs to be studied more 
extensively. In this paper, it can be indicated theoretically that the Pigovian tax, as a traditional way of addressing 
environmental problems, is able to mimic the result derived from the employment of environmental services payment. 
The difference is that environmental services payment improves the welfare of environmental service producers, 
whereas the Pigovian tax reduces it. A positive Pigovian tax increases the optimal rotation, which is positively 
associated with environmental improvement, but certainly reduces forest owner's welfare. This difference should be 
taken into account in the public policymaking so that perverse incentive may be avoided. Payment for environmental 
services  as an additional income to forest growers, not as alternative source of income, is a potential tool to address 
simultaneously issues of environment and poverty that are frequently contested.
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Introductio
How to motivate plantation forest owners to increase the 
biomass of standing stock of their forests? Standing stock 
stores carbon, so that the more standing biomass is 
maintained the more carbon is stored. It implies that carbon in 
the air will be reduced. Environmental quality will be better 
as concentration of carbon in the air is reduced. Therefore, 
increasing forest biomass will improve quality of the 
1environment . What incentives or disincentives are needed in 
order to increase biomass of plantation forests? Can the 
traditional approach solve the problem without creating 
perverse incentives? Internalizing environmental costs or 
benefits is a necessary condition for an effective 
environmental policy (Bithas 2006). Once a policy is 
adopted, it should be administered. Very often, we focus 
more on the policy itself but lack of attention to its 
implementation (Bontems & Bourgeon 2005). Then a funny 
phrase emerges stating that the policy was good but never 
implemented. A policy that was never implemented in 
essence is not a policy at all.
The classical problem in forest economics is to determine 
optimal rotation (Löfgren & Mattsson 1995). This problem 
was solved by Germany forest economist, Faustmann, in 
1849. Determination of optimal rotation is still interesting 
today to be studied further, mainly due to development of 
human awareness to better appreciate forests more than just 
timber producer. Determination of forest plantation rotation 
n with payments for environmental services (PES) was written 
by among others, van Kooten et al. (1995), Appels (2001), 
and Tassone et al. (2004).
They analyze the impact of payments for carbon 
sequestration on the optimal rotation of the Faustmann's 
plantation forest model. They show that PES increases the 
optimal rotation.
Forest owners determine the optimal rotation to 
maximize the present value of net income flow. The longer 
the rotation, the more biomass that will be contained by a 
given tract of land. In other words, prolonging the rotation 
will raise the carbon stored per area unit of land. The further 
question is how to encourage forest owners to be willing to 
lengthen the rotation of their forests? What compensation 
should be given to forest owners?
From different point of view, plantation forest businesses 
produce timber, as the main product, and externalities that are 
frequently called environmental services today. The optimal 
rotation determination is essentially also the optimal 
production determination. We know that the optimal 
production is determined by output and input prices. 
Furthermore, taxes or subsidies tied to every unit of output 
produced can potentially be used to control the optimal 
production level. It is what has been acknowledged as 
2Pigovian Tax . Recently, payments for environmental 
services have been becoming more attractive as a direct 
payment for compensating what has been done by plantation 
forest owners.
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The potential whether  tax or subsidy can mimic the 
optimal rotation derived from direct PES is discussed in this 
paper. What will be the impact of the 2 approaches on the 
welfare of forest owner? The welfare impact is very 
important to be considered in selecting appropriate policy 
instruments in order to achieve the goal. A mistake in 
choosing the instruments may result in a failure of achieving 
the goal. Hence, adequate analysis needs to be done prior to 
making a decision. This paper differs from the one written by 
Appels (2001) in 2 aspects, e.g. firstly, the plantation forest 
analyzed in this paper is synchronized plantation forest, and 
secondly, the Pigovian Tax will be used to mimic the result 
delivered by payments for environmental services approach.
In order to achieve the goal, this paper is organized as 
follows. Following this introduction section, section 2 
discusses briefly payments for environmental services.  
Section 3 presents the optimal rotation determination by 
employing modified Faustmann's model for synchronized 
forests. The optimal rotation determinations with and 
without payments for environmental services are discussed. 
Section 4 discusses the impact of payments for 
environmental services on the optimal rotation.  Section 5 
discusses how tax can mimic the same optimal rotation 
delivered by payments for environmental services. Next 
section will be discussing the impact of each approach on 
environment and social welfare. The last section is 
conclusion.
Payments for Environmental Services (PES)
The concept of PES has emerged from an economic 
discussion on how to internalize externalities in the 
production process. Mirroring the discussion on the use of 
economic instruments to reduce negative externalities such 
as contamination through the internalization of the costs, in 
the 1990's there began an exploration on the use of economic 
instruments to maintain and expand the flow of positive 
externalities, such as environmental services, by 
internalizing the benefits, either through direct payments to 
those responsible for maintaining certain land uses, or 
through market development and creation of environmental 
services (Rosa et al. 2004).
Payment for environmental services is a relatively new 
approach, and there is not yet a settled definition of the term. 
It can be used very broadly to include, for example, pollution 
charges (Pagiola & Platais 2002). Here it is used more 
narrowly to focus on mechanisms under which those who 
provide positive externalities of storing carbon in forest stand 
are compensated for doing so. Although environmental 
services in general have public goods properties, the amount 
of carbon stored in forest stands is relatively easy to measure. 
In addition, the owners of forest stands can be identified very 
easily. Hence, payment for carbon storage services can be 
made rather easily.
As global climate change has been becoming more 
worrying issue, the carbon reduction from the air becomes 
more compelling to be materialized immediately. At the same 
time, development of forest plantation is often hampered by 
low financial return. From this point of view, payments for 
environmental services will provide incentive for developing 
plantation forests. Hence, payments for environmental 
services are expected to be able to make plantation forest 
more attractive. The Clean Development Mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol-expires at the end of 2012, even though 
Indonesia has difficulties in taking advantage of it, offers 
opportunities to developing countries to tap payments for 
environmental services from developed coountries (Schoene 
& Netto 2005).
The main problem of environmental issues is that the 
environment has the characteristics of public goods. Thus, 
it is difficult to expect that private individuals are willing 
to take the initiative to voluntarily improve the environ-
ment. Therefore, concerted action is a necessity that 
cannot be avoided. In this context, the role of government or 
of a mutually recognized authority in resolving environ-
mental issues is absolutely necessary. Compared with private 
goods, the transaction and administration of public goods 
will be more complicated. Direct interaction between 
providers and users of environmental services may not be 
efficient.
Direct payment to forest stands as carbon storages is 
tacitly derived from a wrong view, which is a higher demand 
for timber is always correlated with more deforestation and 
forest degradation (Gan & McCarl 2007). Whereas, the 
higher demand for timber can also be translated into higher 
reforestation. The question needs to be answered is under 
what condition a higher demand for timber can be translated 
into higher reforestation and when this relation fails. The 
answer has been available around us for quite some time, but 
apparently very few who pay close attention. The key factor 
responsible for the success is well-defined land rights. The 
others supporting factors are competitive price and relatively 
adequate infrastructure, especially road network. Since 1990 
plantation forest, on private lands, in Java Island has been 
increasing tremendously. In 1990 the private forests were 1.9 
million ha, rose to 2.7 million ha within 2000-2003, and felt 
to 2.6 million ha within 2006-2008 (Balai Pemantapan 
Kawasan Hutan Wilayah XI Jawa-Madura 2009). Along 
with the increase in forest area, the standing stock of 
commercial timber from the private forests has increased 
3
within the period of 1990-2008 from 55.9 million m  in 1990 
3
to 78.8 million m  within 2000-2003, but slightly felt to 74.8 
3
million m within 2006-2008. Has Java Island passed 
through the turning point of Environmental Kuznets Curve?
Modified Faustmann's Model for Synchronized Forest 
To construct synchronized forest as a modified 
Faustmann's model, let's assume that forest areas of H 
hectares are divided into T plots, T where is the optimal 
rotation we want to determine. It is well known as normal 
plantation forest. The growth of standing forest volume 
follows V (t) where t Î [0,T] is stand age, so that at the optimal 
rotation the timber volume produced is V (t). The price of 
timber harvested at any age is p that is assumed to be 
1 
3independent from stand age , while environmental services 
 are priced p per unit volume of standing stock annually. We 
2  
assume that only carbon stored in themain stem is considered 
for the payment. We also assume that the whole areas have 
the same quality. The plantation forests are managed for 
 infinite period of time and the interest rate, r, is assumed to be 
constant forever. Development cost of plantation per hectare 
139
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Since p >0-,  p >0, and p >p , then expression [8] holds 
1 2 1 2    
when the following 3 equations are satisfied:
is c, which is spent at the beginning of the rotation, and there 
is no any other cost needed prior to harvesting.
In order for the discussion to be understood rather easily, 
firstly I will present the optimal rotation determination of 
normal plantation forest without carbon storage 
compensation. Next discussion will be the optimal rotation 
determination of normal plantation forest with carbon 
storage compensation. The compensation will be given as 
long as the standing stock of plantation forest is maintained 
on the field. During the first rotation, the standing stock of 
plantation forest increases up to steady state level when the 
oldest stand reaches its optimal rotation age.
Optimal rotation without carbon storage services 
payment Without carbon storage compensation, the revenue 
earned by forest manager only come from selling timber at 
price p . The objective of the management is to maximize net 
1 
present value (NPV) of net income stream by choosing the 
optimal rotation. This objective can be written as equation  
[1]:
140
First order necessary condition for the maximum NPV is in 
equation [2]:
The optimal rotation is found by solving the equation 
4[2] for T . Equation [2] basically says that marginal revenue 
of delaying equals marginal cost of waiting plus marginal 
cost of net annual income. This notion can be seen more 
easily by rewriting equation [2] as equation [3]:
    [3]
Optimal rotation with carbon storage services payment  
Standing stock at the time just prior to harvesting is, which is 
resulted from summing up of all standing stocks from 
different ages. In continuous notation it is:
Harvesting will take an amount of V (T) away from the 
total standing stock and the timber harvested is sold at the 
price of p - it is assumed to be constant forever, while the 
1 
remaining standing stock is given a compensation for 
carbon storage services. Let us assume that the service 
compensation is p per year for each unit of standing stock 
2  
maintained in the field. In terms of per unit of timber, it is 
5assumed that p < p . Let us further assume that the 
 1 2
compensation will have been given since the very beginning 
of plantation. From the first harvesting and on, any time the 
standing stock available in the field that stores carbon is 
assumed to be constant at equation [4]: 
    [4]
Forest manager will choose the optimal rotation to 
maximize the present value of the net income stream. Since 
both the timber harvested and the standing stock produce 
income stream, the forest manager should attempt to 
optimize, at least in a certain condition, the income coming 
from the timber harvested and the one coming from carbon 
storage services by choosing the optimal rotation. The 
manager's objective can be formulated as equation [5]
The first order necessary condition that must be met for 
the optimal rotation is in equation [6]:
Now it is the time to answer the initial question 
concerning the effect of payment for carbon storage services 
on the optimal rotation of fully regulated plantation forest. To 
answer this question, I will exploit the equation [2] and 
equation [6] that will be presented in the section 4.
Effect of carbon storage payment on the optimal rotation  
Let us denote the optimal rotations resulted from equation [2] 
and equation [6] by   and   respectively. Assuming that
          then by using equation [2] we will have:
Substituting equation [7] into this last equation and 
manipulating the result will yield in equation [8]
Expression [11] can be simplified into equation [12]
 [12]
However, since             ,              , and               then it must 
be the case that                                   implying that: 
                [13] 
It can easily be seen that equation [13] contradicts 
against equation [12]. Hence, we have to reject the  
assumption and conclude otherwise, that is. It says that 
payment for carbon storage services will increase the 
optimal rotation of fully regulated forest. By employing the 
6first-order stochastic dominance , we know that for the same 
area of land fully regulated forest with a longer rotation will 
have more biomass than the one with a shorter rotation. In 
other words, payment for carbon storage services will 
improve the quality of the environment by storing more  
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
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carbon in forest stand instead of letting it fly in the air. 
Payments for environmental services may potentially attract 
more people to cultivate plantation forest.
Tax or Subsidy?
Despite weaknesses it contains, Pigovian tax or subsidy is 
a perfect approach to internalizing externalities (Baumol 
1972; Green & Sheshinski 1976; Parry 2012).  A Pigovian tax 
is a tax levied on a market activity that generates negative 
externalities. If externalities generated are positive, then the 
tax must be negative, meaning a subsidy. To analyze whether 
or not taxation or subsidy is able to mimic the result delivered 
by the Equation [6], I rely on the equation [2] Let  denote the 
plantation development tax per hectare. This tax imposition 
will change the equation [2] into:
In order for the equation [14] to be able to produce the same 
optimal rotation as it was produced by the Equation [6] ,then 
the following condition must be satisfied:
Solving the equation [15] for  yields:
For, the equation [16] will produce nonnegative. It means 
that to achieve the same environmental quality as it was 
delivered by payment for environmental services approach, 
then plantation development cannot be given a subsidy. The 
opposite is true, that plantation development must be taxed. A 
plantation development subsidy can increase the optimal 
rotation when as it has been mentioned earlier, this 
assumption is not realistic.
By using the same procedure, the taxation on timber sale 
can be determined to produce the same optimal rotation. Let  
denote the sale tax per cubic meter of  timber sold. The 
equation [2] becomes:
In order for the optimal rotation to be T *, then the following 
2
condition must be met:
Solving the equation [18]  for t  yields:
2
We can see that both numerator and denominator always 
have positive sign. Hence, t * must have positive sign that 
2
implies it must be a tax. It means that a timber sale tax can be 
used to lengthen the optimal rotation. Similar to the 
plantation development tax, this timber sale tax also creates 
additional burden to the party who has produced positive 
externalities, who is supposedly given a compensation for the 
services provided. Of course, it is socially unjust and cannot 
be justified. A similar result is presented by Tassone et al. 
(2004) for Faustmann's scenario. Justus Wesseler suggests a 
contingent incentive to overcome the problem, that is the 
subsidy is delivered when the plantation owners meet the 
rotation required (personal communication).
Impact on Environment and Welfare
Individually, impact of a subsidy, either to product price 
or development costs, on the optimal rotation is negative, due 
to a lower standing stock, but the whole impact could be 
positive. It is true that a subsidy makes forest owners lower 
the optimal rotation, but the subsidy might attract more land 
owners to grow plantation forest. In other words, a subsidy 
will possibly make more plantation forests with a shorter 
rotation. Of course, we cannot determine the net impact with 
certainly unless we know subsidy elasticity of optimal 
rotation and of forest expansion. In general, however, 
inclusion of the external benefits from carbon uptake results 
in rotation ages only a bit longer than the financial 
(Faustmann) rotation age (van Kooten et al. 1995). Similar 
result apparently holds for synchronized normal forest.
In terms of social welfare, payment for environmental 
services is better approach compared to taxation approach. 
Both approaches are able to produce the same environmental 
quality but utterly different social welfare. Objective 
function as it is formulated in the equation [1]  shows that net 
present value of perpetual forest management increases with 
a decrease in costs of plantation development or an increase 
in the sale price. In other words, an imposition of a tax either 
on the plantation development or timber sale will reduce the 
profit. Hence, the imposition of the Pigovian tax to improve 
environmental quality in this case is absurd, in which 
plantation forest owner who generates positive impacts on 
the environment should incur environmental costs. The 
decrease in the profit for plantation forest owner is economic 
disincentive for developing plantation forest in the long run. 
So, we need a new way to address the problem.
Payments for environmental services seem to offer such 
alternative a way of improving environmental quality at 
individual level of plantation. They provide correct 
incentives to plantation forest owner to a certain level, 
beyond which the payments will work in the opposite 
direction. As an additional income, the payments increase the 
welfare of plantation forest owner. Applying payments for 
environmental services to poor forest farmers can potentially 
achieve 2 goals; they are improving quality of the 
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environment and reducing poverty. Unfortunately, the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia still had an 
understanding that the payment of carbon storage is a 
business that needs to be burdened with royalty, not as 
compensation for positive externalities deserve accepted by 
forest owners (see Regulation of Forestry Minister 
P.36/Menhut-II/2009). In the appendix of P.36/Menhut-
II/2009, we can see that the government intends to take away 
10% of PES to private forests, which are usually small in size 
and owned by low income farmers who need to be helped.
It is true that PES is consistent with environmental 
improvement at both individual and aggregate levels, but its 
implementation could be more complicated than providing a 
subsidy. Storing carbon in standing forests as required by 
forest carbon trading systems is so complicated and 
potentially inefficient. The buyers should monitor the carbon 
stored periodically due to the principal-agent problem. Errors 
are very likely encountered in calculating carbon storage 
(Tavoni et al. 2007). In short, transaction costs of carbon 
trading are potentially high (van Noordwijk et al. 2008). 
While a contingent subsidy can be executed more easily. 
Especially for small-scale plantation owners, the optimal 
rotation is determined more by the needs of the family than by 
considerations of profit maximization.
To this day, carbon trading in Indonesia is still limited to a 
very noisy discourse rather than significant realities. Too 
much lip services than reality for the benefit of forest owners. 
Effort of several parties in Indonesia to take advantage of 
CDM was ended in failure. Many administrative 
requirements, especially with regard to legal documents on 
the ground, are very difficult to fulfill. Again, this suggests 
that the carbon trade transaction costs are still too high, so 
that carbon trading still cannot be implemented efficiently. 
So much efforts have been made to make the forest carbon 
markets work, such as institutional arrangement (Corbera et 
al. 2009), carbon banking to open more opportunity to small 
scale forest owners (Bigsby 2009), and carbon pricing stored 
in standing forests (Hunt 2008). In a very limited scale, 
carbon trade has occurred in Indonesia. The closest example 
is the forest of Mount Walat which receives revenue from the 
carbon storage payments for a period of 30 years. Another 
example, which is frequently mentioned, is a “Mandatory 
PES” for water service in Lombok (Pirard 2012).
The lip service is increasingly apparent as just a mere 
promise when we compare between the realization of carbon 
trading with the subsidies given to fossil fuels. What a great 
irony when the activities that emit carbon were heavily 
subsidized, while aid to activities that capture and store 
carbon is only such very noisy a discourse. Fuel subsidy 
given in 2006 was Rp64.2 trillion, in 2007 was Rp83.8 
trillion, and in 2008 was Rp139.1 trillion. Comparing these 
real subsidies and Regulation of Forestry Minister 
P.36/Menhut-II/2009 generates ironic situation, which is 
ruining the environment is rewarded while improving the 
environment is punished. Reducing carbon emission is just 
rhetoric unless supported by healthy fiscal policies that 
promote carbon stock in standing as well as in preserved 
timber.
Conclusion
Any improvement of quality of the environment must 
should be based on the goal to enhance human welfare, both 
buyers and providers of environmental services. Payments 
for environmental services can improve quality of the 
environment and at the same time increases forest owner's 
welfare. While a tax can improve quality of the environment 
but reduce forest owner's welfare individually. In other 
words, payments for environmental services offer win-win 
solution, while a tax forces win-lose solution to achieve the 
same quality of the environment individually. Providing a 
subsidy may decrease environmental quality at individual 
level, but aggregately it might deliver a better environmental 
quality because more land owners might be attracted by the 
subsidy to grow forests. Public policymakers need to be 
aware of this difference. We need policies that depart from a 
good idea and at the same time we also must consider how to 
implement them effectively and efficiently. It is clear that 
payments for environmental services is a good idea and 
makes sense, but how to make it happen?
References
Amacher GS, Ollikainen M, Koskela E. 2009. Economics of 
Forest Resources. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press. .
Appels D. 2001. Forest Rotation Lengths under Carbon 
Sequestration Payments. Working paper, Conference of 
Economists.  Perth: University of Western Australia.
Balai Pemantapan Kawasan Hutan Wilayah XI Jawa-
Madura. 2009. Potensi Kayu dan Karbon Hutan Rakyat 
di Pulau Jawa Tahun 1990-2008. Yogyakarta:  
Kementerian Kehutanan RI.
Baumol WJ. 1972. On taxation and the control of 
externalities. American Economic Review 62(3):307-
322. 
Bigsby H. 2009. Carbon banking: Creating flexibility for 
forest owners. Forest Ecology and Management 
257(1) :378-383.  
.
Bithas K. 2006. The necessity for environmental taxes for the 
avoidance of environmental thievery. A note on the 
paper “environmental responsibility versus taxation”. 
Ecological Economics 56(2):159-161. 
.
Bontems P, Bourgeon JM. 2005. Optimal environmental 
taxation and enforcement policy. European Economic 
Review 49(2):409-435. 
Corbera E, Soberanis CG, Brown K. 2009. Institutional 
dimensions of payments for ecosystem services: an 
analysis of Mexico's carbon forestry programme. 
E c o l o g i c a l  E c o n o m i c s  6 8 ( 3 ) : 7 4 3 - 7 6 1 .  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X0800483X
ht tp : / /dx .doi .org /10 .1016/  
j.foreco.2008.09.018
http://dx. 
doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.11.026
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016 
/S0014-2921(03)00036-9.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.008.
JMHT Vol. XVIII, (2): 138-143, Agustus 2012
EISSN: 2089-2063
DOI: 10.7226/jtfm.18.1.138
Pemikiran Konseptual
ISSN: 2087-0469
143
Gan J, McCarl BA. 2007. Measuring transnational leakage of 
forest conservation. Ecological Economics 64(2):423-
432. Special Section-Ecosystem Services and 
A g r i c u l t u r e .  
.
Green J, Sheshinski E. 1976. Direct versus indirect remedies 
for externalities. Journal of Political Economy 
84(4):797-808. .
Hunt C. 2008. Economy and ecology of emerging markets 
and credits for bio-sequestered carbon on private land in 
tropical Australia. Ecological Economics 66(2-3):309-
318. .
Löfgren KG, Mattsson L. 1995. Thorsten Streyffert (1892-
1983): Economist and forester. Journal of Forest 
Economics 1(3):395-407.
Pagiola S, Platais G. 2002. Payments for environmental 
services. Environment Strategy Notes 3:1-4. 
Parry IWH. 2012. Reforming the tax system to promote 
environmental objectives: An application tomauritius. 
Ecological Economics (in press). 
.
Pirard R. 2012. Payments for environmental services (PES) 
in the public policy landscape: a “mandatory” spices in 
the Indonesian recipe. Forest Policy and Economics 
1 8 : 2 3 - 2 9 .   
.
Rosa H, Barry D, Kandel S, Dimas L. 2004. Compensation 
for Environmental Services and Rural Communities: 
Lessons from the Americas. Working papers.  Political 
Economy Research Institute. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts.
Schoene D, Netto M. 2005. The Kyoto Protocol: what does it 
mean for forests and forestry? Unasylva 56:3-11.
Tassone VC, Wesseler J, Nesci FS. 2004. Diverging 
incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: 
an economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in 
the south of Italy. Forest Policy and Economics 6:567-
578. 
.
Tavoni M, Sohngen B, Bosetti V. 2007. Forestry and the 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.02.032
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/260477
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.09.012
http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.02.014
h t t p : / / d x . d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1 0 1 6  
/j.forpol.2011.09.002
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1389-9341(03)00006-
6
carbon market response to stabilize climate. Energy 
P o l i c y  3 5 : 5 3 4 6-5 3 5 3 .  
.
van Kooten GC, Binkley CS, Delcourt G. 1995. Effect of 
carbon taxes and subsidies on optimal forest rotation age 
and supply of carbon services. American Journal of 
A g r i c u l t u r a l  E c o n o m i c s  7 7 ( 2 ) : 3 6 5-3 7 4 .  
.
van Noordwijk M, Suyamto DA, Lusiana B, Ekadinata A,  
Hairiah K. 2008. Facilitating agroforestation of 
landscapes for sustainable benefits: tradeoffs between 
carbon stocks and local development benefits in 
Indonesia according to the fallow model. Agriculture, 
Ecosystems and Environment 126(98-112):5346-5353.
Note
1 = Biomass also plays role in protecting water regime and 
controlling soil erosion. In general, we assume that 
environmental services rise as standing biomass 
increases.
2 = Although it is called tax, the Pigovian tax could be a 
subsidy, that is when the optimal tax is negative.
3 = This assumption is just for simplicity. We know that 
timber price harvested from young stand is cheaper that 
harvested from older stand.
4 = This result is slightly different from the necessary 
condition for optimal rotation of Faustmann's scenario 
taking the form of:
However, applying L’Hopital rule will produce:
5 = The dimension of  is currency unit per volume unit (for 
example Rp    ), while that of  is currency unit per 
 -1
volume unit per year (for example Rp    year ). So,  and 
are not comparable in this sense. However, if we think of 
as payment for a cubic meter of timber in a particular 
year and as payment for services provided by a cubic 
meter of timber in a particular year, then and are indeed 
comparable.
6 = By definition, “the distribution first-order stochastically 
dominates if, for every nondecreasing function, we 
have”. For standing stock, it can be said that the 
distribution of standing stock first-order stochastically 
h t t p : / / d x . d o i . o r g /  
10.1016/j.enpol.2006.01.036
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1243546
JMHT Vol. XVIII, (2): 138-143, Agustus 2012
EISSN: 2089-2063
DOI: 10.7226/jtfm.18.1.138
Pemikiran Konseptual
ISSN: 2087-0469
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-=¢
-
-
rt
rt
e
r
p
c
eTVTrVTV
1
)()()(
Te
r
rtr
1
1
lim
0
=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-®
-3
m
-3
m
